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Abstract
Do large datasets provide value to psychologists? Without a systematic methodology for working
with such datasets, there is a valid concern that analyses will produce noise artifacts rather than
true effects. In this paper, we offer a way to enable researchers to systematically build models and
identify novel phenomena in large datasets. One traditional approach is to analyze the residuals of
models—the biggest errors they make in predicting the data—to discover what might be missing
from those models. However, once a dataset is sufficiently large, machine learning algorithms
approximate the true underlying function better than the data, suggesting instead that the
predictions of these data-driven models should be used to guide model-building. We call this
approach “Scientific Regret Minimization” (SRM) as it focuses on minimizing errors for cases
that we know should have been predictable. We demonstrate this methodology on a subset of the
Moral Machine dataset, a public collection of roughly forty million moral decisions. Using SRM,
we found that incorporating a set of deontological principles that capture dimensions along which
groups of agents can vary (e.g. sex and age) improves a computational model of human moral
judgment. Furthermore, we were able to identify and independently validate three interesting
moral phenomena: criminal dehumanization, age of responsibility, and asymmetric notions of
responsibility.
Keywords: moral psychology, machine learning, scientific regret
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Scaling up Psychology via Scientific Regret Minimization:
A Case Study in Moral Decision-Making
Introduction
The standard methodology in psychological research is to identify a real-world behavior,
create a laboratory paradigm that can induce that behavior, and then test a variety of hypotheses
on a group of participants. This methodology was first pioneered over one hundred years ago and
remains the de facto approach today. While it enables researchers to dissociate individual
variables of interest, it can also lead to over-fixation on a specific paradigm and the small amount
of variations it offers in contrast to more broadly sampling the space of experiments relevant to
the behavior of interest. As a result, several researchers have started to call for a shift towards
mining massive online datasets via crowdsourced experiments (Griffiths, 2015; Jones, 2016;
Goldstone & Lupyan, 2016; McAbee, Landis, & Burke, 2017; Paxton & Griffiths, 2017; Awad et
al., 2018; Schulz et al., 2019) because the scale offered by the internet enables scientists to
quickly evaluate thousands of hypotheses on millions of participants.
The Moral Machine experiment (Awad et al., 2018) is one recent example of a large-scale
online study. Modeled after the trolley car dilemma (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1984; Greene,
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001), this paradigm asks participants to indicate how
autonomous cars should act when forced to make life-and-death decisions. In particular,
participants were presented with two types of dilemmas: pedestrians vs. pedestrians, in which an
empty car must choose between killing two sets of pedestrians (see Figure 1), and passengers vs.
pedestrians, in which a car must choose between saving its passengers or a group of pedestrians.
The Moral Machine experiment collected roughly forty million decisions from individuals in over
two hundred countries, making it the largest moral reasoning experiment ever conducted. In
addition to the vast number of judgments collected, the experiment operated over a rich problem
space: the many possible combinations of twenty different types of agents (e.g., man, girl, female
doctor, dog) as well as contextual information (position of the car, crossing signal) resulted in
millions of unique dilemmas being presented to participants. With all these variations, the
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Figure 1. A sample moral dilemma using the Moral Machine paradigm (Awad et al., 2018). Here,
the participant must choose whether the car should stay and kill a girl, old woman and a dog, who
are all illegally crossing, or whether the car should swerve and kill an infant, a woman, and a dog,
who are all legally crossing.
question thus becomes: for any given dilemma, do participants prefer the car to stay or swerve?
Furthermore, what factors influence each decision?
Psychologists have developed a standard statistical approach for analyzing behavioral data
to answer such questions: identify all the possible predictors for an individual’s decision and fit a
model using these predictors. By analyzing the statistical significance of each predictor or an
overall model metric that penalizes complexity (e.g., the Akaike information criterion (Akaike,
1998)), the researcher finds a model that best trades off model complexity with accuracy.
Unfortunately, this approach does not scale well with large datasets. Statistical significance is
achieved with lower effect sizes in large samples, and complexity penalties are dominated by
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measures of fit such as the log-likelihood. As a result, when the dataset is sufficiently large, this
approach will always favor the more complex model even if the increase in predictive accuracy
per data point is trivial. An even stronger critique of this approach is that it assumes prior
knowledge of the relevant predictors. In the Moral Machine dataset, the question is not just how
important the different factors might be to making moral judgments, but what these factors are to
begin with. One may try to test all possible interactions, but there can easily be an exponential
blowup in the number of parameters, reducing the interpretability and thus the explanatory power
of the model. For example, a naïve featurization of the Moral Machine dataset results in more
than 11,000 three-way interactions. Given that the Moral Machine dataset allows forty-way
interactions and the relevant predictors may be complex nonlinear functions of the lower-level
features, this approach would be difficult to implement in practice. What is needed is an efficient
and systematic way of analyzing large datasets to identify interesting behaviors and the features
that give rise to them.
Understanding the Moral Machine dataset in this manner is simply a microcosm of the
broader scientific enterprise. Consider a scientist interested in moral psychology. How does she
contribute to the field? She reads papers and combines that knowledge with her own personal
experiences, building an internal model that can predict behaviors in different settings. In parallel,
she reads the scientific literature to find models that explain these effects. Then, by analyzing the
differences between her own mental model and the literature, she either proposes an explanation
for a known phenomenon or hypothesizes a novel effect. She conducts an experiment that
evaluates her claim and continues this scientific process again.
We believe large datasets should be tackled in the same way, and we formalize this intuition
in a process we call “Scientific Regret Minimization” (SRM), by analogy to the notion of regret
minimization in machine learning (Lai & Robbins, 1985). First, we suggest that researchers
should leverage the size of large datasets to train theoretically-unconstrained machine learning
models to identify the amount of variance in the dataset that can be explained (Khajah, Lindsey,
& Mozer, 2016; Peysakhovich & Naecker, 2017; Kleinberg, Liang, & Mullainathan, 2017;
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Figure 2. Scientific Regret Minimization. After collecting a large dataset, we use machine
learning models to separate the signal from the noise. We then critique psychological models with
respect to the signal identified by the machine learning model and continue doing so until both of
the models converge.
Fudenberg & Liang, 2019; Glaser, Benjamin, Farhoodi, & Kording, 2019). Next, because these
models do not necessarily give insight to the underlying cognitive processes, a simple and
interpretable psychological model should be trained on the same dataset. Researchers should then
critique the psychological model with respect to the black-box model rather than the data. The
intuition here is that the psychological model should only be penalized for incorrectly predicting
phenomena that are predictable (i.e. we should pay close attention to those errors that result in
regret). This critiquing process should continue until the predictions of both models converge,
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thereby ending with a model that jointly maximizes predictive and explanatory power. The
residuals from this process may correspond to novel effects, and one can run separate experiments
that independently validate them. A summary of this approach is outlined in Figure 2.
The method of refining models by analyzing their errors (also known as “residuals”) is
often employed in scientific modeling (Box & Hunter, 1962; Blei, 2014; Linderman & Gershman,
2017). In this paradigm, researchers begin by proposing a model and fitting it to the data. By
looking at the inputs where the model’s predictions and the data diverge, they attempt to identify
new relevant features that will hopefully increase the model’s accuracy. They then incorporate
these new features into the model, fit it to the data, and continue repeating the process. Our
approach is different because we suggest that, once the dataset is sufficiently large, models should
be critiqued with respect to a powerfully predictive model rather than the data. Critiquing with
respect to the data in large datasets can be difficult because the top residuals often reflect noise.
Formally, let f(x) be the true function we are trying to understand, and let the data be
y = f(x) + , where  ∼ N (0, σ2 ). Furthermore, let us assume we are trying to predict the data
with a psychological model g(x). The expected squared residual between the psychological
model and the data is
E
p(x,y)
[
y − g(x)
]2
= E
p(x)
[(
f(x)− g(x)
)2]
+ σ2 (1)
That is, the expected residual between the model and the data, y − g(x), will be the true residual,
f(x)− g(x), plus a term that captures the noise variance. (Derivations of all results appear in
Materials and Methods). The correlation between the residuals from the data and the true
residuals will thus have an upper bound determined by the noise variance. This highlights an
important problem with using residuals between the model and data to guide model-building. The
manual process of critiquing models with respect to their residuals often focuses on using the
largest k residuals to formulate new predictors. However, as the number of unique inputs
increases, these k residuals will mostly reflect noise because E[max ||] increases as the sample
size increases.
If we think back to our hypothetical scientist, she is analyzing the differences between her
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internal model and the psychological models in the literature. Once she has read enough of the
literature and has enough real-world experience, her internal model will be more sophisticated
than a simple table lookup of the data. Formally, let f̂(x) correspond to a data-driven machine
learning algorithm, such as a neural network. The expected residual between this model and the
psychological model is
E
p(x,y)
[
f̂(x)− g(x)
]2
= E
p(x)
[(
f(x)− g(x)
)2
+
2
(
f(x)− g(x)
)(
fˆ(x)− f(x)
)
+
(
fˆ(x)− f(x)
)2] (2)
The latter two terms in the right-hand expression correspond to the covariance of the predictive
and psychological models’ errors, and the generalization error of the predictive model. For these
residuals to be more highly correlated with the true residuals than the residuals from the data, we
need
E
p(x)
[
2
(
f(x)− g(x)
)(
fˆ(x)− f(x)
)
+
(
fˆ(x)− f(x)
)2]
< σ2 (3)
Because the generalization error of data-driven machine learning algorithms decreases with the
amount of the data with with they are trained (Huang et al., 2018), this inequality will hold when
the dataset is sufficiently large. Once this condition is met, we should critique the psychological
model with respect to the machine learning model rather than the dataset. Figure 3 demonstrates
an example of how the residuals between a neural network and a simple linear model become
more representative of the true residuals than the residuals between the data and the linear model.
In this paper, we apply Scientific Regret Minimization to the Moral Machine dataset. We
demonstrate that a multilayer feedfoward neural network outperforms simple psychological
choice models for predicting people’s decisions, and we then continuously critique a rational
choice model until its predictive accuracy rivals that of the neural network. The result is an
informative, interpretable psychological theory that identifies a set of moral principles that inform
people’s judgments – exactly the kind of insight that is relevant to informing policy around new
technologies such as autonomous vehicles. This process also allowed us to identify three subtle
and complex moral phenomena, which we validated by running preregistered experiments. Our
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Figure 3. Scientific Regret Minimization demonstration. (a) A graph that outlines the true
polynomial function, the data drawn from the polynomial function (with added noise), and a
neural network’s prediction (b) The correlation between the data residuals and the true residuals
versus the correlation between the neural network residuals and the true residual for a simple
linear model fit to the data. (c) The average squared residual between the data and the true
function versus the average residual between the neural network and the true function. As
predicted, residuals to the neural network correlate better with the true residuals when the error of
the neural network falls below the noise in the data. Ten simulations were run for each dataset
size and error bars in figures (b) and (c) reflect ±1 SEM.
end product is (1) a computational model of moral judgment that jointly maximizes explanatory
and predictive power as well as (2) the identification and replication of several principles behind
human moral reasoning.
Results
Computational Modeling
Formalization. Scientific Regret Minimization first calls for identifying a paradigm of
interest and then critiquing a simple and interpretable cognitive model with respect to a
data-driven predictive model. We restricted ourselves to the subset of the Moral Machine dataset
that contained pedestrians vs. pedestrians dilemmas (N = 15,226,477). We used a rational choice
model (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1973) as our cognitive model to explain human moral judgment,
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assuming that, in the Moral Machine paradigm, humans constructed values for both sides of
pedestrians (i.e., vleft and vright) and saved the side with the higher value. Each side’s value was
determined by aggregating the utilities of its agents:
vside =
∑
i
uili (4)
in which ui was the utility given to every agent type i (e.g., man, girl, female doctor, dog), and li
represents the number of those agents on that side. This formalization offers that a participant’s
choice c obeys the softmax choice rule, which states that participants chose to save a side in the
following way:
P (c = left|vleft, vright) = e
vleft
evleft + evright (5)
We implemented this rule by fitting a logistic regression model to the data in order to infer
the utility vector u. Initially, we ran three models with differing sets of constraints on this utility
vector. The first model, ‘Equal Weight,’ required all twenty agents to have the same weight (i.e.
we set u = k1 and inferred the constant k). On the other extreme, we built a ‘Utilitarian’ model
that had no constraints on the utility vector. The third model, ‘Animals vs. People,’ was a hybrid
that allowed different weights for humans and animals, but had the constraint that all humans
were weighted equally and all animals were weighted equally.
These three models did not incorporate the main inspiration behind the trolley car dilemma:
a resistance to intervening and thus killing bystanders, which is not justified by utilitarian
calculus. In order to incorporate such deontological principles, we expanded the definition of the
value of a side:
vside =
∑
i
uili +
∑
m
λmfm (6)
in which λm refers to the value of principle m and fm is a binary variable indicating whether that
principle was relevant to the given side. We used this formalization to build a fourth model, which
we called ‘Expanded,’ and proposed that two potential principles were relevant in the Moral
Machine paradigm. The first was that a side was penalized if saving it required the participant to
swerve. This penalty has been the primary focus of many moral psychology experiments based on
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the trolley car dilemma (Greene et al., 2001; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004;
Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Second, because the Moral Machine dataset had three
different crossing signal statuses (crossing legally, crossing illegally, and the absence of a crossing
signal) we added a penalty if a side’s pedestrians were crossing illegally. This side might have
been penalized by participants because the participants were waiving their rights to protection by
violating the law (Nino, 1983), and participants may have preferred to kill the pedestrians whose
rights have been waived. We used logistic regression to infer the values of u and λ.
In addition to training these choice models, we also built a standard multilayer feedforward
neural network. This network had forty-two inputs: twenty corresponding to the agents on the
left, twenty for the agents on the right, one for the car side, and one for the crossing signal status,
thus completely specifying the given dilemma. (It should be noted that one variable for the
crossing signal status of the left-hand side is sufficient because the crossing signal status of the
right-hand side is just the opposite). These inputs were the same as the ‘Expanded’ model, except
that the ‘Expanded’ model had the added constraint that the value of an agent was constant across
both sides (i.e., a girl on the left side was just as valuable as a girl on the right side), while the
neural network had no restriction.
Initial Results. The top panel of Figure 4 reports the results of training all the models on
differently-sized subsets of the data. Each model was trained on eighty percent of the subsets, and
the metrics here reflect the results when tested on the held-out twenty percent. We report accuracy
and area under the curve (AUC), two commonly used metrics in evaluating models of binary
decisions. Furthermore, we also calculated the normalized Akaike information criterion (AIC), a
metric in which a smaller number suggests a better model (Akaike, 1998).
In this training, the rational choice models performed extremely well at small sizes, and
their performance stayed relatively consistent as the dataset size increased. On the other hand, the
neural network performed poorly at small sizes, but became better with larger ones and eventually
surpassed the choice models. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Neural Network had a
better AIC than the Expanded model despite the fact the former had over three thousand
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Figure 4. (a-c) Performance of initial choice models and neural network as a function of dataset
size. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM. (d-f) Comparison of a choice model and a neural network
before incorporating axes of differences versus after incorporating axes of differences. The
addition of these features resolves much of the gap between the choice model and the neural
network. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM.
parameters while the latter only had twenty-two. This result affirms our earlier point that metrics
like the AIC become uninformative, reducing to a measure of the log-likelihood, when the dataset
is sufficiently large. Most importantly, though, the neural network’s eventual performance
suggested there were systematic effects that our choice models were predicting incorrectly. We
leveraged these residuals via SRM to build a better choice model of human moral judgment.
Improving the Model
Identifying Axes of Differences. The standard methodology for critiquing models
suggests calculating residuals from the data, and Table 1 reports the five largest of these with a
minimum sample size of one hundred participants. We claim that the residuals for these dilemmas
may often reflect noise and that the neural network’s predictions are more representative of the
true function than the data. For example, in the top residual between the data and the choice
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model, a car is headed towards a group of four humans (a man, a woman, a girl, and a male
executive). On the other side is a dog and three cats. According to the data, over 99% of the 649
participants in this dilemma stayed in the lane and chose to kill the humans instead of the animals.
The choice model predicted a strong effect in the opposite direction, and this prediction was
reasonably close to the neural network’s prediction, suggesting that the choice model may not be
mispredicting here. To confirm this, we looked at the dilemmas that followed these conditions:
the car was headed towards agents that were comprised of men, women, girls, male executives, or
any combination of them; the other side comprised of dogs and/or cats; there was an absence of a
crossing signal; the number of agents on each side were identical; and at least fifty participants
responded to the dilemma. There were forty-five such dilemmas. In forty-four of these forty-five
dilemmas, only 11.3% to 25.5% of participants chose to kill the side with humans. The forty-fifth
dilemma was the one with the top residual, and here 99.4% of participants chose to kill the human
side. The results of the forty-four other dilemmas suggest that the data for this dilemma is noisy,
and thus we shouldn’t critique the choice model for disagreeing with the data here.
Similarly, consider the second top residual. Here, a car is headed towards an old woman
and a pregnant woman, who are crossing illegally. On the other side is a dog and cat crossing
legally. Both the data and the neural network predicted participants would not kill the humans.
However, the magnitudes were drastically different, and the correct magnitude is needed to
understand the priority of this residual. In the data, only 5.1% of the 924 participants killed the
humans, while the neural network predicted 25.8% of participants would. Like above, we
conducted an analysis of the data in similar dilemmas. We looked at dilemmas in which the car
was headed towards agents that were either pregnant women, old women, or both; the pedestrians
in front of the car were crossing illegally; on the other side of the car were animals; the number of
agents on the left and right side were equivalent; and at least fifty people responded to the
dilemma. In twelve of the thirteen dilemmas, 14.7% to 35.8% of participants chose to kill the side
with humans. The thirteenth was the dilemma reflected here, and thus the data of similar
dilemmas suggests the neural network’s prediction is more accurate than the data. Therefore,
SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 14
while this dilemma exhibits a large residual for the choice model, the magnitude of the residual is
overestimated when critiquing with respect to the data.
Table 1
Top Residuals to Data (proportions show observed or predicted proportion killing left side).
N Data Choice Model Neural Network
649 0.994 0.115 0.168
924 0.051 0.591 0.258
2671 0.292 0.760 0.346
146 0.274 0.736 0.349
2589 0.287 0.741 0.338
Table 2 reports the largest residuals between the choice model and the neural network. We
suggest that these residuals reflect the ‘true residuals’ better than the data. In these dilemmas,
participants must decide whether the car should stay and kill the illegally crossing human or
swerve and hit the legally crossing animal. Most participants chose to swerve, and the neural
network correctly predicted this result. However, the ‘Expanded’ choice model often predicted
the opposite. Looking at its coefficients, we can understand why: there was a penalty for both
illegally crossing and swerving, and the sum of those penalties outweighed the utility differences
between the human and the animal. We clustered those dilemmas as humans-versus-animal
dilemmas, and it seemed that, in these instances, humans should be saved regardless of their
crossing signal status and relationship to the side of the car. This represented a deontological
principle, a moral rule independent of the consequences of the action (Alexander & Moore,
2016). Thus, while our ‘Expanded’ choice model only used two deontological principles, we
added a third for future iterations: if a given dilemma requires choosing between humans or
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animals, humans should be preferentially saved. This feature would have been difficult to justify
when looking at the residuals from the data, because the top residual there actually exhibited a
strong effect in the opposite direction. Going down the list of residuals, we are able to cluster
another group of dilemmas with high errors and conducted a similar analysis shown in
Supplementary Table S1. Most salient to us in those dilemmas was an age gradient. Similar to
above, future iterations of our model incorporated a deontological principle explicitly favoring the
young in old-versus-young dilemmas.
Table 2
Top Residuals to Neural Network (proportions show observed or predicted proportion killing left
side).
N Data Choice Model Neural Network
2541 0.301 0.699 0.272
2541 0.249 0.662 0.239
153 0.366 0.746 0.326
146 0.370 0.715 0.296
2561 0.195 0.637 0.220
Incorporating Axes of Differences. Humans versus animals and old versus young were
two of six ‘axes of differences’ the Moral Machine researchers explicitly manipulated in their
experiment. The other four were fat versus fit, more versus less, male versus female, and high
status versus low status. While these axes were not explicitly revealed to the participant, the
residuals we identified suggested participants were sensitive to them. We incorporated these six
new features as additional deontological principles into our ‘Expanded’ choice model and plotted
the results in the bottom panel of Figure 4. The new choice model, ‘Expanded + Axes’ had a
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comparable accuracy to the neural network, demonstrating that we were able to build a better
predictive model of moral judgment while retaining interpretability and explanatory power.
Furthermore, we added these axes as inputs into the neural network to create ‘Neural Network +
Axes.’ This model outperformed the original network at smaller dataset sizes but became
seemingly identical at larger ones, suggesting that the original network could construct these axes
once there was sufficient data. These axes were at least as complex as twenty-way interactions. A
naïve approach in model-building would call for the addition of all two- and three-way
interactions between the features, and yet these would still not formalize the principles we found.
Incorporating all feature interactions in a brute force manner (which would be necessary to
discover the principles above) would result in an exponential blowup of parameters, and this
number of parameters would dwarf that of the neural network.
Despite the initial success in increasing accuracy, the model-building process still displayed
a potential for improvement (as indicated by the AUC curve), and thus we conducted more
iterations of our loop. Using the residuals from the second iteration, we identified axes not
explicitly manipulated by the researchers, such as Pregnant Women and Doctors versus other
humans, and split previous axes into sub-axes (e.g., young versus old was split into young versus
adult, adult versus old, and young versus old). The third and fourth iterations modeled two-way
and three-way interactions between the axes of differences, the crossing signals, and the
intervention status. Table 3 displays the final results of our model-building process. The resulting
model predicted human decisions with an accuracy comparable to the neural network and was
entirely interpretable (all axes are outlined in Supplementary Table S2). The table also shows the
maximum possible accuracy when using the aggregate data to predict the choice for every given
dilemma via a table lookup algorithm (i.e. if 90% of participants in a given dilemma chose to
swerve, the empirical prediction for that dilemma will be 90%; as a result, it should be noted that
the performance of this ‘model’ was not calculated out-of-sample, while all the other models
were). Supplementary Tables S3 to S8 report the residuals for the subsequent iterations. The
features we identified at these later iterations reflect more subtle (and complicated) principles.
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While there was conceptual overlap between the top neural network residuals and top data
residuals for the first iteration, the gap seems to grow at the later iterations, in which the top data
residuals seem to be very different than the top neural network residuals.
Table 3
Comparison of Model Fit under Different Metrics
Model Type Accuracy AUC AIC
Equal Weight 0.617 0.628 1.305
Animals vs. People 0.681 0.701 1.239
Utilitarian 0.719 0.779 1.161
Expanded 0.756 0.814 1.052
Explicit Axes (Iteration 1) 0.760 0.823 1.021
Additional Axes (Iteration 2) 0.764 0.825 1.019
Two-Way Interactions (Iteration 3) 0.764 0.829 1.003
Three-Way Interactions (Iteration 4) 0.768 0.830 0.999
Neural Network 0.768 0.833 0.999
Empirical Upper Bound 0.804 0.890 N/A
Empirical Results
Model-building is exploratory and has the vulnerability of overfitting to the data. To
evaluate this, we identified interesting effects from three iterations of SRM. First, regarding a new
axis of difference, we found convincing evidence that participants excluded criminals from moral
protections afforded to other human agents. We previously discussed the need to incorporate a
deontological principle in humans-versus-animals dilemmas that prefers saving the human side.
While doing this helped the predictive power of our model overall, it also erred on a subclass of
other dilemmas: criminals versus animals. In order to build a better model of human moral
judgment, we had to explicitly remove the humans-versus-animals feature from these dilemmas
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and introduce a separate criminals-versus-animals feature, thus dehumanizing criminals in the
eyes of our model.
Second, we were able to identify an intuitive interaction between kids and an illegal
crossing status. Consider two dilemmas (illustrated in Supplementary Figure S1) where in the
first, the participant must choose between saving an old woman or a girl and In the second, the
participant must choose between saving either an old woman and a woman, or a girl and a
woman. Rational choice models are based on a linear utility function and would consider these
dilemmas to be treated equivalently, but the Moral Machine data and the neural network revealed
that participants did not always do so. Rather, participants treated the dilemmas as equivalent
when the side with children was crossing legally or if there was an absence of a crossing signal,
but not when the side with children was illegally crossing. In the latter cases, the side with
children in the second dilemma (i.e., with an adult) was penalized more than the corresponding
side in the first dilemma.
Lastly, there was an intriguing asymmetric interaction between car side and crossing signal
status in both male-versus-female dilemmas and fat-versus-fit dilemmas. Here, when the car was
headed towards the higher-valued individual (i.e., the female or the athlete) in the absence of a
crossing signal, the probability of saving the individual was roughly halfway between the
probability of saving them when they were legally crossing and the probability of saving them
when they were illegally crossing. However, this relationship did not hold when the car was
headed towards the lower-valued individual. Rather, in those cases, the probability of saving the
individual was significantly lower than the halfway point and close to the probability of saving
them when they were illegally crossing. Intuitively, lower-valued individuals aren’t given the
“benefit of the doubt” when their crossing legality is ambiguous.
We ran three preregistered experiments on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in order to replicate
and confirm these effects revealed by SRM.
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Experiment 1: Criminal Dehumanization
In this experiment, participants chose between saving a human and a dog. We varied the car
side (dog, human), type of human (criminal, homeless man, old man, adult man), and crossing
signal status (legally crossing, illegally crossing, N/A) for a total of twenty-four dilemmas. Each
participant saw four of these twenty-four dilemmas. We calculated the percentage of participants
that chose to save the human over the dog in every dilemma. For each car side and crossing signal
combination, we conducted a Chi-squared test determining whether participants chose to save
criminals less than each of the other three humans. This resulted in eighteen separate Chi-squared
analyses, and for these eighteen analyses, criminals were saved at a rate between 11% to 28% less
than the other human agents. All analyses were significant at the α = 0.05 level, and seventeen of
the eighteen were significant at the α = 0.001 level. Graphical results are displayed in Figure 5
and tabular results are represented in Supplementary Table S9.
Figure 5. Dehumanization of Criminals. When pitted against dogs, participants save criminals at
a significantly lower rate that other human agents.
Experiment 2: Age of Responsibility
In this experiment, participants either chose between saving a child or an old adult or they
chose between saving a child and an adult versus an old adult and an adult. We varied car side
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(child, old adult), crossing signal condition (legally crossing, illegally crossing, N/A), and sex
(male, female) for a total of twenty-four stimuli. Each participant saw six of the twenty-four
dilemmas. We aggregated responses for all dilemmas in order to calculate the percentage of
participants that chose to save the young side. For each car side, sex, and crossing signal
combination, we conducted a Chi-squared analysis comparing the percentage that saved the
young side in a child versus old adult dilemma to the percentage that saved the young side in a
child and adult versus old adult and adult dilemma. Of these twelve analyses, we hypothesized
four would be significant at the α = 0.05 level while the other eight would not be. Specifically,
we hypothesized that the analyses where the young side was crossing illegally would be
significantly different but that the dilemmas in the other crossing signal conditions would not be.
Three of the four hypothesized significant effects were significant at the α = 0.05 level, while
seven of the eight hypothesized null effects were not significant at the α = 0.05 level. Results are
graphically represented in Figure 6 and reported in Supplementary Table S10.
Experiment 3: Asymmetric Notions of Responsibility
Each dilemma in this experiment was either a male versus female or an athlete versus a
large person. We varied car side and crossing signal status, as well as age (adult, old) for the
male-female dilemmas and sex for the fat-fit dilemmas, for a total of twenty-four dilemmas. Each
participant only saw four of the twenty-four possible dilemmas. For each axis (i.e., male-female
or fat-fit) and car side combination, we conducted a Chi-squared analysis comparing the
percentage that saved the higher-valued individual in the absence of a crossing signal to the
average of the percentages that saved in the legal and illegal crossing settings. We hypothesized
that when the car was headed towards the lower-valued individuals, the proportion saved in the
absence of a crossing signal condition would be significantly less than the mean of the other two
crossing signal settings, while we did not think there would be a significant difference when the
car was headed towards the higher-valued individuals. All four of our hypothesized significant
effects were significant at the α = 0.05 level and all four of our hypothesized null effects were not
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Figure 6. Age of Responsibility. Graphs demonstrate the differences in participants’ judgments
when deciding between a child and an old adult versus when deciding between a child and an
adult versus an adult and an old adult. The dilemmas are roughly equivalent when the side with
children are either crossing legally or when there is absence of a crossing signal, but not when
they are crossing illegally.
significant at the α = 0.05 level. Results are graphically represented in Figure 7 and reported in
Supplementary Table S11.
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Figure 7. Asymmetric Notions of Responsibility. The dotted line indicates the average of the
legal and illegal crossing conditions. When the car is headed towards the high-valued individual,
their judgments are close to that predicted by the dotted line. However, when the car is headed
towards the lower-valued individual, their judgments are close to the ones in which the individual
is crossing illegally.
Discussion
When there is so much data in front of us, where do we even start to look? This problem is
not unique to large-scale experiments. Rather, it is the problem of the scientific enterprise in
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general. The scientific method has offered a solution: identify the signal in the data and iteratively
critique hypotheses until they are able to explain as much of the signal as possible. In this paper,
we formalized this idea as a loop in which we critique interpretable and theoretically-constrained
psychological models with respect to a data-driven machine learning algorithm. Standard
scientific techniques critique models with respect to the data, but once the dataset is sufficiently
large, a purely data-driven machine learning algorithm like a neural network can often provide a
better estimate of the true underlying function than the data itself.
We illustrated this methodology in the domain of moral decision-making. Psychological
models of moral reasoning are often derived from consequentialist and deontological theories in
moral philosophy (Kant, 1785; Bentham, 1789; Greene, 2007), and these theories have been
extremely fruitful in motivating moral psychology research. However, it is inevitable that a highly
theoretically-driven scientific program will lead to incomplete models of human behavior. By
contrasting these constrained models with data-driven models, we were able to identify
shortcomings and use them to build a model that is both theoretically grounded and powerfully
predictive. We found that incorporating axes of differences and their interactions with other
deontological principles improved the accuracy of a rational choice model of moral
decision-making. We then validated three of our findings by running independent preregistered
experiments. In the remainder of the paper, we relate these findings to the moral reasoning
literature and highlight the implications of our results.
Our results in Experiment 1 suggest that criminals are excluded from certain protections
most humans are given, namely preferring to save them compared to dogs. These findings are
consistent with a long line of work in sociology and psychology suggesting criminals are treated
as a lower class of individuals than others in society when it comes to evaluating their status as a
human being (Jahoda, 1999; Viki, Fullerton, Raggett, Tait, & Wiltshire, 2012; Bastian, Denson, &
Haslam, 2013; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Opotow et. al (Opotow, 1990) proposed that
dehumanization is a form of moral exclusion in which a victim can lose their entitlement to
compassion. Besides moral exclusion, other potential frameworks to understand participants’
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behavior may be through retributive justice (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Witvliet et al., 2008) and
standard consequentialist reasoning. We believe both of these factors were also present in this
paradigm, but that they were already taken into account in our choice model as the inferred weight
given to criminals. The moral exclusion argument is supported by the fact that incorporating a
humans-versus-animals principle was an important predictor of Moral Machine behavior, but that
we had to specifically remove this label from situations that pitted criminals versus animals. Since
these axes of differences were derived from the features of the agents (Kim et al., 2018), our
modeling suggests that participants did not honor the ‘human’ feature for criminals.
The results from Experiment 2 suggest children are given a privileged status when
assigning blame. The jurisprudential logic for the privileged status of children in the law is that
children often lack the mens rea, i.e., the knowledge of wrongdoing and a necessary condition for
criminal conviction, when partaking in illegal activity (Platt & Diamond, 1966; Dalby, 1985;
Bandalli, 1998).1 Earlier, we proposed that the negative penalty associated with crossing illegally
is justified by a consensual theory of punishment (Nino, 1983), in which an individual waives
their rights to being protected by the law when committing an illegal action. In our experiment,
when the illegally crossing pedestrians were solely comprised of children, participants did not
penalize them as much as when there was one adult. Formally, the jurisprudential logic behind
participants’ decisions here would be that the children did not have the necessary mens rea when
crossing illegally and thus they did not willingly waive their rights to being protected by the law.
As a result, they should not be penalized as much as adults, who presumably did have the mens
rea and thus knowingly waived their rights. Furthermore, the empirical effect is stronger when the
car is on the side of the old adult, which is intuitive under the consensual theory of punishment
framework as it seems more reasonable to excuse a child compared to an adult for not realizing
they were crossing illegally when the car was on the opposite side.
The results in Experiment 3 demonstrated that when the car is headed towards the
1An intuition for why mens rea is considered important is encapsulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s
famous quip: “Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and kicked.” (Holmes, 1881)
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higher-valued individual and there is an absence of a crossing signal, they are treated half as if
they are crossing legally and half as if they are crossing illegally. The same is not true when the
car is headed towards the lower-valued individual. In those cases, the individual is treated in
almost the same manner as when they are illegally crossing. One conjecture for this behavior is a
form of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Alicke, 2000; Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009).
Participants may have started off by assuming that the pedestrian in the same lane as the car is the
one at fault. However, because the participant was motivated to save the higher-valued individual,
they treated the absence of a crossing signal as an ambiguity that suggested equal probability of
crossing legally or illegally. Conversely, when the car is headed towards the lower-valued
individual, participants may have been motivated to infer that the individual was probably
crossing illegally, and thus use the fact they are in front of the car to justify this belief.
The Moral Machine dataset proved to be a fruitful case study for Scientific Regret
Minimization: rational choice models performed well, but we were still able to use a neural
network to identify shortcomings once the dataset became sufficiently large. We expect that this
methodology can be used in different domains, especially in mature fields (which may have
unwittingly missed important systematic effects), but also in newer fields wherein the gaps
between theoretically-inspired models and data-driven models remain large. Future work can
extend our methodology in at least two different ways. The first is automating the identification
and clustering of residuals into human-interpretable features. The second is that, while we
assumed a specific functional form (i.e., a rational choice model) for the final model, it is
plausible that this theoretical model is incorrect and thus we may need to develop a systematic
way to identify the proper functional form itself.
On a broader note, we hope to further the development of a synergistic correspondence
between psychology and data science approaches in scientific modeling (Rosenfeld, Zuckerman,
Azaria, & Kraus, 2012; Dwyer, Falkai, & Koutsouleris, 2018; Bourgin, Peterson, Reichman,
Griffiths, & Russell, 2019). Cognitive science famously grew out of the intersection of six
different fields (Gardner, 1987), but some have suggested that this revolution did not create the
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emergence of a new discipline (Lakatos, 1986; Miller, 2003; Núñez et al., 2019). Rather, research
often proceeds independently in each contributing field. One potential reason for the lack of
unification lies on a philosophical level: different scientific traditions have different epistemic
values and are methodologically incommensurable (Kuhn, 1962). For example, psychology
prioritizes explanation while machine learning is almost exclusively focused on prediction, and
their methodologies reflect these differences (Hofman, Sharma, & Watts, 2017; Yarkoni &
Westfall, 2017). To live up to promise of the cognitive revolution, we need to truly integrate the
different values and methodologies implicit in these related fields. We hope the approach in this
paper offers a step in that direction.
Methods
Mathematical Analysis and Simulations
The proof for the result in Equation 1 is below:
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The proof for the result in Equation 2 is the following:
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)2]
For Figure 3, data was generated from the polynomial function 3x(x− 2)2(x+ 2)2(x+ 1),
and the input was uniformly sampled from the domain [−2.5, 2.5] and rounded to the nearest
thousandth, thus allowing for multiple samples of the same data point. Each data point had noise
independently drawn from a normal distribution N (0, 10). The neural network used a ‘ReLU’
activation function and had two hidden layers, the first with one hundred hidden neurons and the
second with fifty hidden neurons. Ten different simulations were run for each different dataset
size.
Computational Modeling
The neural network was trained to minimize the binary crossentropy between the model’s
output and human binary decisions. We conducted a grid search on the space of hyperparameters
to identify the optimal settings for the network. A neural network with three 32-unit hidden layers
and a ‘ReLU’ activation function was used for all the analyses in this paper.
Train/test splits were based on unique dilemmas as opposed to each judgment. There was a
wide distribution of the number participant judgments per unique dilemma, and we wanted both
the training and test sets to have similar distributions. Thus, in order to approximate an 80/20
split, we sorted the dilemmas by the number of judgments and binned the dilemmas into groups
of five. For every bin, four were randomly assigned to the training set and the fifth was assigned
to the testing set. As a result, all train/test splits were approximately, but not exactly, 80/20 splits.
SCIENTIFIC REGRET MINIMIZATION 28
Empirical Results
2,086 participants across twelve conditions were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
and paid $0.50 to participate in an experiment in which they indicated their preferences in
twenty-eight Moral Machine autonomous car dilemmas. The order of all twenty-eight dilemmas
was randomized for each participant. Five of the twenty-eight dilemmas were attention checks. In
the attention checks, participants had the option of either saving or killing everyone in the
dilemma. If they chose to kill everyone more than once, they were excluded from further analysis.
The experiment’s preregistration called for 163 participants per condition (twelve conditions for a
total N = 1, 956) after the exclusion criteria were applied.
Nine of the remaining twenty-three dilemmas were passengers versus pedestrian dilemmas
while fourteen were the stimuli for the hypotheses. The nine passengers versus pedestrian
dilemmas were included to add variation because the fourteen stimuli used for the hypotheses
were all pedestrian versus pedestrian dilemmas. Answers for these dilemmas were not analyzed.
Furthermore, both the nine passengers versus pedestrian dilemmas and five attention checks were
kept constant across all twelve conditions.
Because there were a total twenty-four possible stimuli for each hypothesis, Hypothesis 1
and Hypothesis 3 stimuli were split into six groups of four and allocated throughout the twelve
conditions such that each group was assigned to two conditions. Hypothesis 2 stimuli were split
into four groups of six and allocated such that each group was assigned to three conditions. Thus,
of the fourteen dilemmas participants saw for the hypotheses, four were for Hypothesis 1, six
were for Hypothesis 2, and four were for Hypothesis 3. The end result was that all Hypothesis 1
and Hypothesis 3 stimuli received 326 judgments while all Hypothesis 2 stimuli received 489
judgments. These sample sizes were chosen in order to achieve 95% power at detecting a true
effect using the Chi-squared proportion test at α = 0.05. Effect sizes were estimated using results
from the Moral Machine dataset.
Experiments were coded using the jsPsych software package (De Leeuw, 2015) and the
interface with Amazon Mechanical Turk was provided with psiTurk (Gureckis et al., 2016). The
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dilemmas were created using the ‘Design’ feature on the Moral Machine website.
The hypotheses, experiments, and analyses were preregistered using the Open Science
Framework at https://osf.io/25w3v/?view_only=b02f56f76f7648768ce3addd82f16abd. The data
from the experiments and the analysis script for the figures in this paper are also uploaded there.
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Supplementary Material
Table S1
Old vs. Young Dilemmas (proportions show observed or predicted proportion killing left side).
N Data Choice Model Neural Network
11554 0.343 0.636 0.333
11578 0.362 0.637 0.344
7166 0.721 0.511 0.747
5758 0.523 0.635 0.403
5691 0.476 0.625 0.395
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Table S2
Axes of Differences
Axis
Humans vs. Animals
Criminals vs. Animals
Pregnant vs. Other Humans
Pregnant + Doctors vs. Other Humans
Executives + Doctors vs. Other Humans
Doctors vs. Other Humans
Old vs. Young
Adult vs. Young
Old vs. Adult + Young
Old + Adult vs. Young
Old + Adult vs. Adult + Young
Old vs. Adult
All Young vs. Other Humans
Male vs. Female
Homeless vs. Other Humans
Executives vs. Homeless
Executives vs. Adults
More vs. Less
Fat vs. Fit
Fat vs. Adult
Adult vs. Fit
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Table S3
Residuals to Data for Second Iteration
N Data Choice Model Neural Network
649 0.994 0.164 0.168
1124 0.000 0.600 0.442
1113 0.288 0.791 0.680
890 0.001 0.396 0.272
365 0.326 0.709 0.719
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Table S4
Residuals to Neural Network for Second Iteration
N Data Choice Model Neural Network
130 0.600 0.869 0.537
1471 0.434 0.712 0.394
2898 0.436 0.714 0.420
3879 0.520 0.786 0.509
3377 0.224 0.508 0.231
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Table S5
Residuals to Data for Third Iteration
N Data Choice Model Neural Network
649 0.994 0.155 0.168
1124 0.000 0.605 0.442
1113 0.288 0.806 0.680
890 0.001 0.693 0.272
365 0.326 0.709 0.719
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Table S6
Residuals to Neural Network for Third Iteration
N Data Choice Model Neural Network
162 0.599 0.835 0.567
2606 0.558 0.765 0.499
8235 0.340 0.637 0.373
175 0.269 0.541 0.283
359 0.315 0.539 0.290
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Table S7
Residuals to Data for Fourth Iteration
N Data Choice Model Neural Network
649 0.994 0.147 0.168
1124 0.000 0.517 0.442
1113 0.288 0.763 0.680
365 0.326 0.766 0.719
187 0.001 0.427 0.393
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Table S8
Residuals to Neural Network for Fourth Iteration
N Data Choice Model Neural Network
175 0.269 0.560 0.283
326 0.301 0.564 0.301
359 0.315 0.552 0.290
172 0.273 0.556 0.304
159 0.308 0.568 0.323
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(a)
(b)
Figure S1. Two Moral Machine dilemmas that demonstrate an age gradient. Rational choice
models treat these dilemmas equivalently, but the data indicated that participants do not do so
when the side with children is illegally crossing.
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Car Side Signal (Human) % Save Criminal % Save Homeless p-value
Human Legal 0.65 0.88 p < .001
Human N/A 0.68 0.84 p < .001
Human Illegal 0.63 0.79 p < .001
Dog Legal 0.78 0.89 p < .001
Dog N/A 0.71 0.90 p < .001
Dog Illegal 0.69 0.83 p < .001
Car Side Signal (Human) % Save Criminal % Save Old Man p-value
Human Legal 0.65 0.87 p < .001
Human N/A 0.68 0.82 p < .001
Human Illegal 0.63 0.81 p < .001
Dog Legal 0.78 0.87 p = .002
Dog N/A 0.71 0.88 p < .001
Dog Illegal 0.69 0.85 p < .001
Car Side Signal (Human) % Save Criminal % Save Old Man p-value
Human Legal 0.65 0.89 p < .001
Human N/A 0.68 0.85 p < .001
Human Illegal 0.63 0.81 p < .001
Dog Legal 0.78 0.91 p < .001
Dog N/A 0.71 0.89 p < .001
Dog Illegal 0.69 0.83 p < .001
Table S9
Results from Experiment 1 comparing the percentage of participants that save criminals versus
dogs and the percentage of participants that save other humans versus dogs. We used a χ2
analysis between the proportions, where N = 326 and df = 1.
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(a) Male
Car Side Signal (Young) % Save (with Adult) % Save (without Adult) p-value
Young Legal 0.83 0.77 p = .013
Young N/A 0.77 0.75 p = .600
Young Illegal 0.71 0.64 p = .024
Old Legal 0.90 0.91 p = .827
Old N/A 0.92 0.93 p = .538
Old Illegal 0.81 0.75 p = .030
(b) Female
Car Side Signal (Young) % Save (with Adult) % Save (without Adult) p-value
Young Legal 0.84 0.80 p = .094
Young N/A 0.78 0.76 p = .403
Young Illegal 0.70 0.65 p = .152
Old Legal 0.92 0.91 p = .562
Old N/A 0.92 0.89 p = .061
Old Illegal 0.81 0.73 p = .001
Table S10
Results from Experiment 2 comparing the percentage of participants that save the young side with
an adult versus the percentage of participants that save the young side without the adult. We used
a χ2 analysis between the proportions, where N = 489 and df = 1.
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(a) Male-Female Dilemmas
Car Side Age % Save (No Signal) % Save (Mean) p-value
Male Adult 0.14 0.25 p < .001
Female Adult 0.55 0.50 p = .224
Male Old 0.19 0.27 p = .012
Female Old 0.55 0.50 p = .196
(b) Fat-Fit Dilemmas
Car Side Sex % Save (No Signal) % Save (Mean) p-value
Fat Male 0.15 0.27 p < .001
Fit Male 0.44 0.46 p = .609
Fat Female 0.16 0.26 p = .003
Fit Female 0.47 0.42 p = .253
Table S11
Results from Experiment 3 comparing the percentage of participants that save the higher-valued
individual in the no crossing signal condition versus the mean of the percentages of participants
saving the higher-valued individual in the other two crossing signal conditions. We used a χ2
analysis between the proportions, in which N = 326 and df = 1.
